

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 29, 2026

Mark Zuckerberg
Chief Executive Officer
Meta
1 Meta Way
Menlo Park, CA 94025

Dear Mr. Zuckerberg:

As members of the U.S. Senate committed to combating antisemitism in all of its forms, we write to express grave concerns regarding the persistent problem of inauthentic accounts and ‘bot farm’ operations abusing social media platforms to develop and spread antisemitic content on your platforms. We also request information about Meta’s current safeguards and enforcement mechanisms to prevent platform abuse by inauthentic accounts on Instagram and Facebook, and to urge Meta to implement reforms to protect users, limit the proliferation of antisemitic content, and strengthen its transparency measures against inauthentic behavior, including by labeling accounts’ country of origin for the American public.

In the last decade there have been a growing number of documented instances of fake accounts operating from outside of the United States and abusing American freedoms on social media platforms by promoting foreign agendas and sowing disunity among the American people, including through promotion of open, hostile, and violent antisemitism. Analysis of online antisemitism across platforms shows that coordinated antisemitic narratives are often amplified by clusters of accounts with disguised locations. In reality, many of these accounts operate across borders and outside of the American communities they target, making their activity difficult to trace or disrupt without reliable location signals.¹ The significant role that inauthentic accounts play in driving disproportionate engagement with harmful content, including anti-Jewish narratives, and mis/disinformation campaigns crafted by anti-democratic adversaries of the United States², has renewed potential to expand with the current widespread rollout of generative AI applications that are used to mimic online human behavior, create divisive and ahistoric content at scale, and thereby exhaust existing Trust & Safety mechanisms utilized by social media platforms.

¹ Network Contagion Research Institute, Rutgers University Social Perception Lab, “America Last: How Fuentes’s Coordinated Raids and Foreign Fake-Speech Networks Inflate His Influence.”, <https://networkcontagion.us/reports/america-last-how-fuentess-coordinated-raids-and-foreign-fake-speech-networks-inflate-his-influence/>

² ABC News. Security analysts flag rise in Russian-created misinformation posts on social media following Kirk shooting.” <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/security-analysts-flag-rise-russian-created-misinformation-posts/story?id=125640078>; Silverman, C. and Kao, J. ProPublica, “Infamous Russian Troll Farm Appears to Be Source of Anti-Ukraine Propaganda”, <https://www.propublica.org/article/infamous-russian-troll-farm-appears-to-be-source-of-anti-ukraine-propaganda>; Aceves, W.J. (2018). “Virtual Hatred: How Russia Tried to Start a Race War in the United States”. Michigan Journal of Race and Law, p. 24, 177. <https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol24/iss2/2/>

Online generally and on social media specially are the two foremost spaces where Americans report experiencing antisemitism in the past year according to *American Jewish Committee (AJC) 's State of Antisemitism in America 2025 Report*.³ In the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, there was a sharp increase in the saturation of online antisemitism, which has taken a decidedly more violent and openly hostile tone since this time.⁴ The proliferation of antisemitism on social media risks fueling harmful content and mis/disinformation that poses a real risk to Jewish Americans' safety and U.S. national security overall. For example, widespread glorification of harm and proactive calls on social media for additional attacks on Jews have been particularly pronounced following political violence on American soil – including the murder of a young couple outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C.⁵ – as well as after the New Year's Day attack in New Orleans.⁶

Research has shown how inauthentic social media accounts, sometimes as part of a network of accounts created by foreign actors, can be used to promote antisemitism online and accelerate calls for violence against Jewish Americans. CyberWell — the first-ever live database of online antisemitism — tracked a sample dataset of 300 verified online posts overtly denying the scope and nature of the October 7 terror attacks that reached upwards of 25 million views within a matter of weeks across social media platforms, indicating the elevated rate at which a modern conspiratorial denial narrative against the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust⁷ was platformed for mainstream consumption. Further, as geolocation data has recently revealed, anti-American and antisemitic content frequently originates from and is amplified by organized networks operated by foreign actors.⁸ These dynamics illustrate how networks of inauthentic accounts can act as force multipliers, accelerating the spread and normalization of hostile and violent antisemitic narratives across a wide array of social media platforms – including on Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok, and YouTube.

Facebook remains the world's most widely used social media platform, yet Meta reports that 5% of Facebook's monthly active users in Q4 of 2025 were fake accounts. While that percentage

³ American Jewish Committee. "The State of Antisemitism in America 2025."

<https://www.ajc.org/AntisemitismReport2025>

⁴ CyberWell. "The Evolution of Online Antisemitism: Pre- & Post October 7", <https://cyberwell.org/reports/the-evolution-of-online-antisemitism-pre-post-october-7/>; CyberWell. "Online Antisemitism 2024 Annual Report."

<https://cyberwell.org/reports/online-antisemitism-2024-annual-report/>.

⁵ CyberWell. "Antisemitic Incitement & Hate Online: Aftermath of the Capital Jewish Museum Shooting in Washington." <https://cyberwell.org/reports/antisemitic-incitement-hate-online-aftermath-of-the-capital-jewish-museum-shooting-in-washington/>.

⁶ CyberWell. "New Orleans Terror Attack Spawns Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories." <https://cyberwell.org/new-orleans-terror-attack-spawns-antisemitic-conspiracy-theories/>.

⁷ CyberWell. "Antisemitism Trend Alert: Denial of the October 7 Massacre on Social Media Platforms." https://cyberwell.org/reports/antisemitism-trend-alert-denial-of-the-october-7-massacre-on-social-media-platforms/#elementor-toc_heading-anchor-5.

⁸ Network Contagion Research Institute, Rutgers University Social Perception Lab, "America Last: How Fuentes's Coordinated Raids and Foreign Fake-Speech Networks Inflate His Influence.", <https://networkcontagion.us/reports/america-last-how-fuentes-coordinated-raids-and-foreign-fake-speech-networks-inflate-his-influence/>, Starr, M. "X location feature is a wake-up call about the media landscape – analysis". <https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/article-876270>

may seem low, in practice, this amounts to approximately 1.1 billion accounts actioned for inauthentic behavior.⁹ Fake accounts often abuse and game engagement algorithms to create outsized influence and spread hateful and violent rhetoric, including incitement of violent acts of antisemitism.¹⁰ Additional transparency like location labels on Meta accounts has the potential to address hatred and mis/disinformation at scale by limiting malicious actors' ability to conceal their true origins and labeling foreign-based accounts for the American public. This step could empower American social media users with clearly labeled data and information, fostering digital literacy, and exposing accounts attempting to subvert American values through abuse of social media platforms.

We cannot continue to play catch up as foreign agents and extremists abuse American social media platforms to spread hate and sow discord on American soil and across the globe. We need collaboration with our most influential social media companies to bring our digital space to a higher level of transparency and integrity. Labeling Facebook and Instagram accounts with their country of origin would be an impactful step toward combatting foreign-based influence networks. While we commend Meta for the existing verification processes and integrity policies in place, more can and must be done to prevent malicious actors from exploiting Meta's policies to spread harmful content online. While Meta's public-facing transparency reports do not indicate that Meta tracks certain violative content as "antisemitic" within the category of hateful conduct, there is an increasing trend of coordinated inauthentic behavior used to amplify antisemitic narratives. With this context in mind, please answer the following questions:

1. What mechanism does Meta employ to ensure that inauthentic accounts spreading antisemitic content are prevented from contributing to engagement metrics or content-creation monetization programs?
2. What safeguards does Meta have in place to identify and take action against inauthentic accounts at scale when these accounts use coded language in posts and comment sections to amplify antisemitic narratives?
3. How does Meta identify non-English speaking bot networks that disseminate antisemitic content online, and what safeguards does Meta employ to ensure consistent detection of inauthentic accounts across all languages used on its platforms?

⁹ Meta. "Community Standards Enforcement Report." Q4 2025, <https://transparency.meta.com/reports/community-standards-enforcement/>.

¹⁰ Pacheco D., Hui P.-M., Torres-Lugo C., Truong B. T., Flammini A., Menczer F. (2021). [Uncovering coordinated networks on social media: Methods and case studies](#). *Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media*, 15, 455–466.; Metzler H and Garcia D. "Social Drivers and Algorithmic Mechanisms on Digital Media." *Perspectives on Psychological Science: A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science* 19:5 (2024). <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11373151/>; Network Contagion Research Institute, Rutgers University Social Perception Lab, "America Last: How Fuentes's Coordinated Raids and Foreign Fake-Speech Networks Inflate His Influence.", <https://networkcontagion.us/reports/america-last-how-fuentess-coordinated-raids-and-foreign-fake-speech-networks-inflate-his-influence/>

4. How does Meta detect repeat offenders, particularly those involved in disseminating coordinated antisemitic content under inauthentic accounts, and prevent them from continuing to spread harmful content by reestablishing accounts under new or falsified identities?
5. What data can Meta provide regarding enforcement actions taken against accounts flagged for unverifiable or inconsistent geolocation patterns over the past 12 months, and what categories of policy violations, if any, have been commonly associated with these accounts?
6. What measures are in place for Meta to identify inauthentic or bot-operated accounts that repeatedly disseminate false or misleading content, and how does Meta evaluate whether geolocation information could enhance its ability to detect and action such activity at scale?

Given the current record-breaking incidents of Jew-hatred, which Americans from across faith groups say they see mostly online, more comprehensive reforms are needed to safeguard users and to limit the proliferation of antisemitic content.¹¹ We look forward to engaging with you further on these deeply important issues.

Sincerely,



James Lankford
United States Senator



Jacky Rosen
United States Senator

¹¹ American Jewish Committee. “The State of Antisemitism in America 2025.”
<https://www.ajc.org/AntisemitismReport2025>